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Holt v. Hobbs: Does a Muslim Prisoner’s Case
Foreshadow the End of Affirmative Action?
By Dawinder Sidhu
Religion & Politics
January 28, 2015

(AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite) Attorney Douglas Laycock, center, speaks with reporters
after his argument before the Supreme Court in Holt v. Hobbs. At left is Hannah Smith, a
senior counsel with the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.

Last Tuesday, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of an Arkansas inmate
who had been barred from growing, for religious reasons, a half-inch beard by the
state prison system. The case, however, is not merely about inmates and prisons. It
confirms that we are in an era of robust judicial protection for religious freedom, and
it informs the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in other contentious areas of individual
rights.
The case, Holt v. Hobbs, was set in motion by Gregory Holt, who also goes by Abdul
Maalik Muhammad. Holt, an inmate housed by the Arkansas Department of
Correction, sought to grow a beard in accordance with his Muslim faith. The
Department prohibits inmates from growing beards, although inmates with a

dermatological condition may grow a beard no longer than a fourth of an inch. Holt
proposed a compromise: he would grow a half-inch beard. The Department did not
budge. Accordingly, Holt proceeded to federal court.
Inmates shed many of the rights they otherwise enjoyed in civilian life. Holt’s religious
rights ordinarily would be among those rights that he would cede to prison
authorities. But, Holt filed his lawsuit under a federal statute, the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which was enacted by Congress in 2000
to accord special protection to inmates’ religious freedom.
Traditionally, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment was read to protect
religious freedom only to the extent that the challenged law itself carved out a
religious exception. In 1963, however, the Supreme Court interpreted the Free
Exercise Clause to require a religious exemption to any generally applicable law that
imposed a substantial burden on the individual’s religious exercise, unless the
government could prove that the law was necessary to further a compelling
governmental purpose. A “substantial burden” generally occurs when the law either
compels an individual to do that which violates the individual’s religious beliefs, or
prohibits an individual from doing that which is mandated by the individual’s
religious beliefs.
In a 1990 case, the Court effectively reverted back to the pre-1963 understanding of
the Free Exercise Clause. In response, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which expanded religious protections to levels
established by the Court in 1963. Under RFRA, a law that substantially burdens an
individual’s sincere religious beliefs must give way, unless the government can
demonstrate that its action furthers a compelling purpose in a way that is the least
restrictive of religious freedom. With the ball back in its court, the Supreme Court
determined that that Congress did not have the constitutional power to enact RFRA,
thereby striking it down insofar as it applied to the states and leaving it binding only
on the federal government.
The back-and-forth continued until Congress passed RLUIPA. RLUIPA contains the
same standards as RFRA, but it applies only to land use and prison contexts and
rests on a different source of constitutional authority. Under RLUIPA, Holt had to
prove that the Department of Correction substantially burdened his sincerely held
religious beliefs. Holt asserted, and the Department did not dispute, that Holt’s
interest in growing a beard was based on a sincerely held religious belief. Further, it
was undisputed that the grooming policy substantially burdened Holt’s religious
beliefs, as the policy placed him in a bind: grow his beard and face discipline for
violating the Department’s policy, or shave completely and violate his sincere
religious beliefs.
With Holt having met this threshold, RLUIPA required the Department to establish
that its policy furthers a compelling purpose in a way that is least restrictive of
religious freedom. The Department defended its grooming policy on two principal
grounds: first, that an inmate would be able to conceal contraband in a half-inch
beard; and second, that an inmate would be able to frustrate or evade quick
detection in the event of a prison emergency or prisoner escape.

The Supreme Court agreed that both of these purposes were compelling. But the
Court ruled that the policy was not the least restrictive ways to advance these
purposes. First, the Court doubted that contraband could get lost in a half-inch
beard. It was “almost preposterous,” a U.S. Magistrate Judge said, that contraband
could be hidden in Holt’s beard. Rather than impose a ban on such beards, the Court
noted that the Department could search prisoners’ beards or require prisoners to run
a comb through their beards. Contraband, such as a “revolver,” Justice Samuel Alito
quipped, would fall out from such combing. Second, the Court noted that the
Department could facilitate the quick and reliable identification of prisoners by
having two photographs of each prisoner on hand: one clean-shaven, and one
bearded. These twin photographs could then be referenced in the event of an
incident.
Further, the Court stated that the Department’s security and identification arguments
were tough to square with the fact that the Department permits prisoners to grow a
fourth-inch beard for medical reasons and permits prisoners to grow hair on their
head beyond the half-inch limit. The Department’s arguments also were undermined
by the fact that a vast majority of state prison systems, and the federal Bureau of
Prisons, allow inmates to grow their hair, either for any reason or for religious
reasons, despite having the same or concerns about safety and identification. The
Department fell short in its effort to explain that it has unique circumstances
necessitating special rules. Indeed, the Department did not give any examples of
situations in which beards hindered the Department’s safety interests. The closest the
Department came was its mentions of incidents in which a prisoner killed a guard
with a “shank” and in which Holt placed a knife against the neck of another inmate.
But these two situations say nothing about the relationship between security and
identification, on one hand, and beards on the other. All told, the Court had little
trouble ruling that the Department’s refusal to allow Holt to grow a religious beard
constituted a violation of RLUIPA.
The decision has wide-ranging implications. The current Supreme Court has made
clear that it intends to give full effect to Congress’s intent to afford broad
protections to incarcerated individuals’ religious freedom. The extent to which
RLUIPA meaningfully shielded prisoners’ religious freedom was unclear. Indeed, the
two lower federal courts sided with the Department, and federal courts had ruled for
prison systems in similar RLUIPA cases. These courts did so primarily because courts
routinely have deferred to the expertise of prison officials. In Holt, the Supreme Court
clarified that deference must be predicated upon specific information related to the
desired religious practice, not speculative statements or generalized concerns about
prison safety and security. In the absence of those details, deference is not owed and
any judicial deference still given would be tantamount to judicial abdication.
In terms of balancing government interests and religious freedom, Holt further
suggests that the Court’s pendulum has swung towards the protective end of the
religious freedom spectrum. Eric Rassbach of the Becket Fund, the public interest
law firm that was part of Holt’s legal team, notes that the case “heralds a new period
of rigorous enforcement of federal civil rights statutes concerning religious
practices.” This recognition of religious freedom extends and includes both

majoritarian and non-majoritarian faiths. The Court repeatedly has vindicated the
rights of non-Christians. But context matters. The Supreme Court’s polarizing opinion
in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby—a RFRA ruling for Christian owners of closely held
corporations—fueled the impression that the Court gave special solicitude to
religious rights claims brought by Christians. In her Hobby Lobby dissent, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg asked whether the Court was truly inclined to recognize the
religious rights of religious minorities. Holt therefore represented, as The New York
Times’ Linda Greenhouse wrote, an opportunity for the Court to “allay suspicions that
they are only interested in the free-exercise rights of Christians.” The Court seized
this opportunity, confirming that it confers religious protection upon Christians and
non-Christians alike.
A plausible claim can also be made that Holt foreshadows the end of affirmative
action in the United States. The connection between religious rights and affirmative
action may not be obvious, but race-based affirmative action is subject to a
demanding standard—whether the admissions policies are “narrowly tailored” to
further a “compelling” governmental objective—that is similar to the standard in
RLUIPA. Accordingly, the Court’s response to the grooming policies at issue in Holt
may inform its potential reaction to affirmative action.
As in Holt, the Supreme Court has determined that the reason why colleges and
universities adopt affirmative action—to achieve the educational benefits of a diverse
student body—is compelling. Accordingly, as in Holt, the permissibility of affirmative
action boils down to the courts’ assessment of how colleges and universities attempt
to achieve that objective. Holt sends a strong signal that the Court will closely
scrutinize the government’s selected approach and the government’s claims as to
the insufficiency of alternatives that don’t implicate protected rights. An ongoing
issue in the affirmative action context, however, is that courts have not been given
meaningful information by which to evaluate whether race-neutral alternatives may
yield a sufficiently diverse student body, in which case the schools’ current use of
race would be gratuitous. If the Court reviews the means used by colleges and
universities with the same vigor it did in Holt, affirmative action policies could be in
danger.
Holt is important in its own right because it eliminates outlier grooming policies to
the benefit of prisoners nationwide. Beyond this, Holt helps to restore the expansive
bounds of religious freedom in this country—and it hints at future Court shifts on
religion and race.
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